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Abstract 
 
Some observers have argued that the IMF’s focus on the institutional weaknesses of the Asian 
crisis countries that are inherently difficult to remedy and not necessarily relevant for the crisis, 
and that their inclusion in IMF programs exacerbated the crisis. This paper argues that besides 
IMF actions, it is important to consider other factors such as governments’ own policy actions 
and the degree of socio-political instability in affected countries to better assess the factors that 
might have exacerbated the crisis. Using Indonesia as a case study, we show that political 
turmoil and government policy actions taken independent of IMF programs lowered the dollar-
denominated stock market returns, while IMF-related news did not have any significant effect 
the returns.  However, the negative impact of independent government policy announcements on 
investor wealth was larger than that of political instability. 
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I.  Introduction 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was heavily criticized during the recent Asian crisis. 
Some observers have argued that the IMF’s focus on the institutional weaknesses of the countries 
that are inherently difficult to remedy and not necessarily relevant for the crisis, and that their 
inclusion in IMF programs exacerbated the crisis by causing investor panic (Feldstein, 1997; 
Radelet and Sachs, 1998; and Sachs, 1999). 
1 
Another potential factor for the worsening of the crisis, which has been largely ignored in the 
literature, is policy actions taken against the crisis by the governments, either independent of 
IMF programs or in conflict with the IMF’s position, such as the introduction of a currency 
board. Such government actions might have contributed to the crisis to the extent that investors 
perceived the actions not credible because of the special relationship between the government 
and corporate sector. Berg (1999), for example, argued that the close relationship between 
government officials and the banking system as well as certain private sector participants, 
especially in Korea and Indonesia, brought about weaknesses in corporate governance and, 
among others, augmented the crisis in important ways.  
A significant level of political violence was also observed in Indonesia, especially during the 
crisis. The violence included ethnic and religious violence in general, and the regional violence 
in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya, in particular. Besides such violence, political 
demonstrations, riots, and chaos took place almost on a daily basis and climaxed in the wake of 
the resignation of President Suharto.  
This paper empirically investigates the relative contribution of IMF actions to the recent 
Indonesian financial crisis, as compared to two other relevant factors, namely, the government’s 
own actions independent of the IMF and the degree of political instability. We focus on the 
Indonesian economy for it suffered the most from the crisis in the region (Cerra and Saxena, 
2000).  Estimates indicate that in 1998 real GDP of Indonesian economy declined by 13.7 
percent, but the decline was 5.8 percent in Korea and about 9.0 percent in Thailand (Berg, 1999). 
In addition, the Indonesian government signed several agreements with the IMF at the beginning 
                                                           
1 Available empirical evidence does not appear to support the view that that IMF actions tend to cause creditor panic, however.  
Hayo and Kutan (2003) provide evidence from a panel of emerging stock markets and conclude that IMF actions do not have 
notable effects on the volatility of the markets arising from creditor panic. In examining the impact in Argentina of an IMF 
agreement announcement during the Tequila crisis, Ganapolsky and Schmukler (2001) also report that the announcement had a 
positive impact on stock and bond returns and played an instrumental role in reverting the dynamics of the crisis.  
  
of the crisis, and IMF advice continued after the first agreement signed on October 31, 1997 
(Hill, 2000). We focus on both stock and foreign exchange market and assess the relative 
significance of the aforementioned factors in exacerbating to the crisis.  In this paper, changes in 
stock and foreign exchange market returns are used as a proxy to measure the reaction of the 
financial markets to the above three events during the crisis. 
In the next section, we outline the estimation methodology, while the third section presents 
the empirical results. The last section concludes the study. 
 
II.  Methodological Issues 
Ganapolsky and Schmukler (2001) investigated the effects in Argentina of IMF agreement 
announcements during the Tequila crisis on asset returns. They model the behavior of the 
variance of financial returns as time varying, using the so-called generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models. Besides their well-known econometric 
advantages over constant variance models, the GARCH models are particularly appropriate for 
the purpose of this study. Such models allow us to test whether IMF actions, the government’s 
own policy actions, and political instability were able to roil financial markets by lowering the 
returns based on a maximum likelihood model that allows time varying volatility of asset returns. 
In this paper, we use the following GARCH(1,1) model.  
Rt = β0 + εt           (1)     
σ
2
t = β1 + β2ε
2
t-1 + β3σ
2
t-1         ( 2 )      
where R indicates asset returns, namely stock returns in the Jakarta market, or foreign exchange 
market returns. Equation (1) is the mean equation for returns, while the conditional variance of 
the returns is given by equation (2).  The mean equation in equation (1) is written as a function of 
some constant with an error term, which has a time-varying volatility, σ
2
t . The conditional 
variance at time t is predicted based on the persistence in last period’s asset market shocks (ε
2
t-1) 
and last period’s conditional variance (σ
2
t-1).   
  The next step is to include socio-political events, independent government economic 
policies, and IMF-driven economic policies into the model. These three variables are inserted 
into the mean equation as follows: 
 
Rt = β0 + β1 AR(1) + β3* government actions + β4 *IMF actions + β5 *Political Turmoil +εt     (3)  
σ
2
t = β6 + β7*ε
2
t-1 + β8*σ
2
t - 1                         (4) 
  
  Our hypothesis is that social and political events as well as own policy actions by the 
government  lower asset returns, while IMF-driven actions increase market returns.  This is 
because news about social and political events, most of them about social disorders and chaos, 
are likely to negatively affect investors’ confidence.  The government’s own economic policies, 
most of which were in opposition to the programs suggested by the IMF, might have also 
affected the confidence of market participants negatively, which could be reflected in lower asset 
returns.  On the other hand, IMF programs come with austerity measures that promote 
transparency and better accountability in the financial markets, which may have a positive effect 
on investors’ confidence.  It is thus hypothesized that IMF news has a positive impact on the 
stock and foreign exchange market returns. These variables are constructed as follows: 
01. Economic policies announced by the government independent of the IMF, which covers 
policy actions and statements by the Indonesian government, parliament, and the central 
bank. 
02. IMF- driven economic actions, those actions induced by the signed IMF programs  
03. Political turmoil, which include demonstrations, political riots, protests, street battles 
between students or opposition members against the police and the military, statements and 
actions by the opposition parties and organizations, ethnic and religious violence, regional 
violence in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya, and election-related violence. 
This set of news is calculated in the respective (0,1) dummy variables, which takes a value of 1 
when a particular type of news occurs a given day and zero otherwise. 
 
III.  Time series model estimation 
Stock and foreign exchange returns are computed as the percentage change in the stock 
price index and exchange rate, respectively, multiplied by 100.  The stock returns are expressed 
in both the rupiahs and the U.S. dollars. The latter is important to view the issue from the 
perspective of foreign investors by taking into account the impact of exchange rate movements. 
A decline in financial returns following some government actions and/or political unrest would 
suggest that local investors do not welcome such actions. Therefore, a significant drop in asset 
returns following an announcement is assumed to worsen the crisis.  
 
Sample period and data 
   The sample period is daily and spans from July 9, 1997 to August 4, 1999.  This sample 
period is interesting because it covers the period under the Suharto regime and the period under 
president Habibie, who took over the presidency on May 21, 1998.  But, more importantly, it 
covers the period from the beginning of the crisis up to the recent past. 
2 Before the crisis, there 
was a boom in the stock market just before the crisis started in July 1997.  Stock price index 
peaked above 700 points before falling rapidly in July - August of 1997 (Figure 1).  The 
downtrend continued, despite occasional attempts to recover, until the end of 1997.  This sharp 
downturn was accompanied by the government’s reluctance to accept IMF terms.  The index 
then started a rapid recovery followed by a one time sharp decrease and somewhat recovered and 
stabilized over several months.  Further decline was experienced in May of 1998. After that 
however, the index recovered slowly and started to stabilize at the end of 1998 before making a 
rapid increase in the price index until June 1999.  This is the recovery period.  After that it 
declined somewhat toward the end of the sample period.   
IMF-related and government action news are obtained from the IMF’s website as well as the 
major media sources, such as the CNN and BBC.  Political risk data are taken from a recent data 
set constructed based on Indonesian news sources.
3. In all estimations, the event dates are used.  
If an announcement is made after business hours, it is included in the next day. 
The data for the stock price composite index in the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) was 
obtained through the JSX-endorsed Indonesia Interactive web page.  As the stock market 
experienced irregularities in the days of its operation (due to public holidays or riots and 
demonstrations in Jakarta), it was necessary, for modeling purposes, to bridge the missing days 
by deleting the days when the stock exchange was closed. The data for the exchange rate of the 
Indonesian currency, the rupiah, was gathered through the private consultant Olsen and 
Associates and expressed in terms of the units of the rupiah per one US dollar.  Hence, an 
increase in the exchange rate means a depreciation of the rupiah relative to the US dollar. 
                                                           
2 Some may argue that the crisis was settling down at the end of 1998.  However, considering the high degree of ongoing political 
turmoil in Indonesia, any event today may cause further deterioration in the confidence of financial market participants and 
therefore, it is unclear if the country is out of the woods yet.  A recent example is the East Timor affair.  Both the rupiah and the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange Index declined by 5.2% and 3.5%, respectively, after the independence vote in East Timor on August 30.  
Therefore, our sample span covers the post-1998 period as well. 
3 Database on Social Violence in Indonesia, 1990-2001. United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, Jakarta, April 
2002.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
            Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the stock returns, both in rupiahs and in U.S. 
dollars, as well as foreign exchange returns.  The stock returns in domestic currency and foreign 
exchange market returns are calculated by log-differencing stock price index and the exchange 
rate, respectively, multiplied by 100.  The dollar-denominated stock returns are obtained by 
converting the domestic stock returns into to the U.S. dollar, using the dollar/rupiah exchange 
rate. Figures 2 and 3 provide a plot the rupiah- and dollar-denominated stock market returns, 
respectively.  
  The descriptive statistics for mean returns indicate that the foreign exchange rate returns 
declined more than stock returns in domestic currency. In addition, the higher value for the 
standard deviation of foreign exchange rate returns suggests that this market was more volatile 
than the stock market.  The figure for the skewness and kurtosis indicate non-normality. To deal 
with this problem, we use the Bollerslev-Woldridge robust standard errors in the GARCH 
estimations. 
        
Empirical Findings 
       Table 2 reports the results for stock returns, both in the rupiahs and the U.S. dollars, and 
foreign exchange rate returns. P-values are reported in parentheses. All equations include an 
autoregressive term, AR(1), to remove serial correlation in returns. They are all significant, 
indicating significant persistency in returns. 
Looking at the results for stock returns in domestic currency first, we observe no significant 
effects of any events at the 10 percent significance level or better. Overall, the results suggest 
that movements in stock returns in domestic currency are not much sensitive to IMF news, 
government actions, or political turmoil. Political turmoil has the smallest p-value (.16), 
indicating that domestic stock market returns are most sensitive, if any, to political news 
When we look at the findings for the foreign exchange returns, the results change 
dramatically. The impact of political turmoil becomes relatively insignificant, while the effects 
of IMF and government actions dominate the changes in the foreign exchange market prices. 
Recall that an increase in the exchange rate indicates a depreciation of the rupiah relative to the 
US dollar. The estimated coefficient for the IMF actions variable is negative, indicating that the  
rupiah appreciated in response to IMF news. On the other hand, the sign of the coefficient for 
government actions is positive, suggesting a depreciation of the rupiah. IMF-related actions 
appreciate the rupiah by 3.77 percent, while government actions bring about a depreciating of the 
rupiah by 0.64 percent.  Note that the IMF actions variable has a much larger statistical 
significance level (4 percent) as well than that of the government actions variable (13 percent), 
suggesting that IMF-related news has the strongest impact on foreign exchange returns during 
the sample period.  
  Turning to the findings for the stock returns in the U.S. dollars, we observe that both 
political turmoil and government actions now have a significant impact on the dollar-
denominated returns, while IMF-related news is not significant. Both political turmoil and 
government actions reduce the dollar-denominated stock returns. The impact of the latter is more 
significant economically than that of political unrest. Combining these finding with those of the 
foreign exchange rate returns above suggests that investors on the foreign exchange market paid 
more attention to IMF actions, while foreign investors operating in the Jakarta stock market 
closely watched government policy actions. These findings are interesting and investor behavior 
during this sample period needs more investigation, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
  Overall, the results indicate government policy announcements taken independent of IMF 
programs and political and social unrest worsened the crisis in the sense of causing lower stock 
market returns for investors, rather than IMF actions. Note that the descriptive statistics data 
reported in Table 1 indicate that the estimated changes in the dollar-denominated returns 
reported in Table 2 were much higher than the average change in the returns, .000029, during the 
sample period, indicating abnormal returns. This is especially true for government policy actions, 
rather than political turmoil. This indicates that it was government policy stance, rather than IMF 
actions, that really had a significant and abnormal negative impact on asset market returns during 
the sample period. 
 
IV. Conclusions   
This paper has attempted to account for the impact of political risk and government policy 
actions in the Jakarta stock and foreign exchange markets during the two-year crisis period and 
compared them with the effects of IMF actions.  The results have indicated that IMF-related 
actions appreciated the rupiah, whereas government policy actions taken independent of IMF  
programs lowered the dollar-denominated stock market returns.  Political turbulence, which took 
place in Indonesia more than in any other Asian crisis economies, especially during the Asian 
crisis, also hurt the returns. However, the negative impact of independent government policy 
announcements on the returns was much larger than that of political instability. 
Overall, the results suggest that policy changes announced by the government and, to a 
some extent, the degree of political unrest exacerbated the crisis. Empirical evidence does not 
support the claim that the IMF’s focus on the institutional weaknesses of the countries during the 
crisis and that their inclusion in signed IMF programs worsened the crisis by bringing about 
lower asset returns. Rather, IMF-related news appeared to have restored the confidence in the 
market, especially in the foreign exchange market. In that regard, our results are in line with 
Ganapolsky and Schmukler (2001) who found that IMF actions tend to have a positive impact on 
stock and bond returns and may play an instrumental role in reverting the dynamics of a financial 
crisis. 
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Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics for Daily Returns 
  Stock returns in Rupiah  Exchange rate returns  Stock returns in US Dollars 
Mean -0.034308 0.208054 -0.000029 
Maximum 15.56073  17.06010  0.003600 
Minimum -12.73181  -26.82640  -0.002473 
Std. Dev.  2.938181  3.790560  0.000508 
Skewness 0.484351  -0.396588  0.256957 
Kurtosis 6.663705  14.23073  12.07578 
      
Jarque-Bera 299.7883  2646.081  1724.981 
Probability 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
      
Observations 501  501  501 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 2: 
Impact of Political Turmoil,  IMF-Driven Policies, and Independent Government Actions 
Variable  Stock returns in Rupiah  Exchange rate returns  Stock returns in US dollars 
Mean equation 
Constant 0.015023 
(0.92) 
0.152373 
(0.33) 
0.000019 
(0.30) 
Political turmoil  -0.360383 
(0.16) 
-0.238296 
(0.33) 
-0.000058 
(0.09) 
IMF-related actions  -0.210830 
(0.65) 
-3.767176 
(0.04) 
-0.000008 
(0.87) 
Government actions  -0.525477 
(0.45) 
0.645846 
(0.13) 
-0.000182 
(0.07) 
AR(1) 0.254015 
(0.00) 
0.307429 
(0.00) 
0.267621 
(0.00) 
    
Variance equation 
Constant 0.432719 
(0.02) 
0.585170 
(0.04) 
0.000000 
(0.55) 
ARCH(1) 0.108908 
(0.00) 
0.434547 
(0.00) 
0.156136 
(0.00) 
GARCH(1) 0.849456 
(0.00) 
0.609317 
(0.00) 
0.858320 
(0.00) 
    
Diagnostic tests 
Log-likelihood  -1216.327 -1194.497 3227.047 
Q(10) serial correlation  5.6511 
(0.77) 
8.4153 
(0.49) 
5.73 
(0.77) 
Q
2(10) ARCH effects  2.2856 
(0.99) 
2.2569 
(0.98) 
2.93 
(0.98) 
Note: p-values are in parentheses. 
  
Figure 1:
Jakarta Stock Exchange Index  (July 1997-August 1999)
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Figure 2:
Jakarta Stock Exchange Index Return,  domestic currency 
(July 1997 - August 1999)
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Figure 3:
Jakarta Stock Exchange Index Return,  US dollars
(July 1997 - August 1999) 
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